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Am. Canoe Ass'n v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Comin'n, 389 F.3d
536 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding environmental groups had standing to
sue on behalf of themselves and their individual members under the
Clean Water Act, based on the Clean Water Act's citizen-suit provision).
The American Canoe Association and the Sierra Club, on behalf of
themselves and their individual members (collectively "ACA"), alleged
the City of Louisa Sewer and Water Commission ("Commission") failed
to comply with the terms of its National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit and, thus, violated the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky dismissed ACA's suit for lack of standing. ACA appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, arguing ACA
had standing to sue the Commission under the citizen-suit provision of
the CWA.
The goal of the CWA is to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of United States waters. To reach this
goal, the Kentucky Department of Environmental Protection issues
NPDES permits that restrict the type and amount of pollutants released
into the environment. As such, NPDES permit holders must monitor
and report pollution discharges. NPDES permit holders who fail to
monitor or report pollution discharges subject themselves to federal,
state, and citizen suits. To establish standing in a citizen-suit pursuant
to the CWA, the complainant must show an injury in fact, that the injury suffered is fairly traceable to the unlawful conduct, and that redress is possible through the requested relief.
Under the citizen-suit framework, ACA alleged the Commission's
failure to adequately report and monitor city pollution discharges
caused ACA recreational and informational injuries that constituted
injuries in fact. The court determined ACA suffered an injury in fact
because, as ACA argued, the Commission acted unlawfully by not providing requested pollution reports. Had ACA alleged the Commission
was simply not complying with the terms of the Commission's NPDES
permit, only an unrecoverable abstract injury, as opposed to an injury
in fact, would result. The court held ACA suffered injuries in fact, that
the injuries were fairly traceable to the Commission's failure to comply
with the Commission's NPDES permit, and that the redress sought was
an appropriate remedy
After finding ACA suffered an injury in fact, the court addressed
the Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Advisory Committee
Act to determine whether ACA had standing. Under these statutes,
litigants achieve standing when an agency denies a request for information. Accordingly, the Commission's refusal to honor ACA's re-
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quest for the pollution reports granted ACA standing. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Thomas Jantunen
Citizens Coal Council v. United States Env'tl. Prot. Agency, 385 F.3d
969 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding the Environmental Protection Agency's
Final Rule adding new subcategories to the Coal Mining Point Source
category under the Clean Water Act exceeded the Agency's statutory
mandate).
The Kentucky Resources Council and the Citizens Coal Council
(together "Councils") petitioned the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth District to review an Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") rule ("Final Rule") propagated under the Clean Water Act
("CWA") that applied to the effluent emissions from coal mining operations.
The CWA assigned EPA the duty to identify pollution control
measures and practices for various pollution point sources. EPA created categories of pollution point sources so that EPA could establish
effluent limitation guidelines for various industries. Within the Coal
Mining Point Source Category, EPA created four subcategories. EPA
did not create a subcategory for remining operations on previously
mined, but then abandoned, land. As technology for remining improved, which made remining a feasible option, the costs associated
with complying with EPA effluent regulations under the existing categories prevented miners from engaging in remining activities.
In response to the need for legislation to allow remining, Congress
passed the Rahall Amendment to the CWA. This amendment created
a modified permit for remining operations and required only that pollution emissions not exceed levels present before commencement of
the remining operation.
EPA created two new subcategories for remining operations under
the Coal Mining Point Source category: the Coal Remining Subcategory and the Western Alkaline Coal Mining Subcategory. The Councils claimed both new subcategories were inconsistent with the CWA
and the Rahall Amendment and were therefore invalid.
The court first considered whether EPA had the authority to create
subcategories inconsistent with the Rahall Amendment. The Rahall
Amendment authorized remining permits only when effluent emissions from the remining activity would be less than pre-remining emissions. The Final Rule allowed a permitting authority to grant a Coal
Remining permit in situations where that authority could not collect
baseline measurements but concluded that remining would reduce
effluent emissions. A permitting authority could issue these permits at
its discretion, bypassing the Rahall Amendment's requirement of base-

